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Section 1: Introduction
Many firms have operations in different segments. Such decisions to diversify presume
that managers believe that diversification is more valuable for the firm than not being
diversified. However, the market does not always value a diversified firm as the
managers’ or economists’ models would imply. In fact, some studies found the
suggestive evidence that diversified firms are actually valued at prices lower than nondiversified firms. This is contrary to economic theory and to managers’ implicit
motivation to diversify. The discount at which diversified firms trade is known as the
“Diversification Discount”. It is the difference in value between the diversified firms, and
a portfolio of stand-alone firms comprising the divisions of the conglomerate.
There is no consensus as to whether diversification actually leads to lower firm value.
One stream of scholars attributed the discount to statistical and measurement issues, such
as sample selection biases and mismeasurement of diversification (Villalonga 2004). A
second stream of scholars proposed inefficiency of conglomerates as the reason why
diversification destroys value. For example, conglomerates may use profit from highreturn divisions to subsidize low-return divisions (cross-subsidization). (Berger and Ofek
1995)
Yue and Zhou(2008) explain that diversified firms should be more valuable than the sum
of the values of its divisions because of their real option value. Managers can redeploy
assets from low-performing to high-performing divisions. They can close down divisions
that lose money and expand profitable ones. Their theory posits that failure to recognize
the real option value leads to diversification discount. However, they use market data to

observe if aggregate market prices behave as though their hypothesis is true. Therefore,
they have no control over what market participants observe, and no way to measure how
individuals react. Consequently, they can provide no direct test of their hypothesis.
Their data can only show how portfolios buying firms in the highest real option value of
diversification (RVD) decile and selling firms in the lowest RVD decile consistently
provide positive return in 19 out of 22 sample years , but they cannot demonstrate
whether these aggregate effects are due to people’s misperception of the option value, or
some other reason. For example, they cannot address whether people undervalue only
the option, or whether they have difficulty combining values of divisions to arrive at
values of the conglomerate (even without adding on the price of the option) or both.
This paper provides a direct laboratory test of whether the demonstrated diversification
discount effect might be due to (1) individuals’ not being able to combine values of
divisions together linearly into a combined value; (2) their inability to recognize the
advantage of the option; or (3) their inability to value it appropriately. Participants in this
study trade securities with each other in a laboratory market setting. These securities are
designed to represent either high-value or low-value segments. In certain periods,
subjects are given the opportunity to convert their securities from one type to another,
thus creating the option and therefore the option value.
Using the above methodology allows me the opportunity to observe whether participants
in my experiments realize (1) that a low-performing segment can be shut down with the
proceeds invested in the higher-performing segment to maximize expected value; (2) that
this creates an option value such that the value of the two segments together is greater

than the value of the segments added together; and (3) whether resulting market prices
reflect the option value or not. Also, when there are different market participants, such
that some do realize these economic truths and others do not, the laboratory setting
allows me to examine whether the “more rational” participants are able to exploit
arbitrage opportunities and make a profit at the expense of the “less-rational” participants.
My results also help to rule out some competing explanations as sole causes of the
observed diversification discount. For example, some studies have argued that
diversification leads to inefficiency and therefore destroys value of the firm (Jensen
1986). In my design, there is no inefficiency due to diversification, and any observed
diversification discount must therefore be independent of inefficiencies of that nature.
Lastly, the lab setting allows me to understand the conditions under which individual
behavior described above leads to aggregate market data that show the diversification
discount.
In my experiments, participants trade with each other in a market setting over a number
of periods. Each period consists of 5 intervals. There are three types of securities: Yellow,
Green and a combination of Yellow and Green securities (i.e., a Combo). Yellow
securities represent low-expected-value divisions and Green securities represent highexpected-value divisions. Participants are allowed to convert the Yellows in their
Combos to Greens and vice versa in certain periods, thereby operationalizing the option
to move resources between divisions.
There are three treatment types in the experiments, the Baseline type, the Experienceeffect type, and the Low-Risk-of-Conversion type. The differences between them involve

(a) the experience a subject has with payoffs from the Yellow and Green securities before
making the conversion decision, and (b) the variance of payoffs between the two
securities. In the Baseline type and the Low-Risk-of-Conversion type, participants make
their conversion decisions early, before trading in the securities. Conversely, in the
Experience-before-Decision type, participants make the conversion decision later, after a
few periods of experiencing dividends from both securities. On the other hand the LowRisk-of-Conversion type presents participants with a Green (high-expected-value)
security with lower variance than corresponding Green securities in the Baseline and
Experience-before-Decision types.
I find that people do understand there is the real option to convert from low-return
security to high-return security. On average, participants at least convert some of their
Yellows to Greens. Also, they recognize Combos with option to convert are more
valuable than Combos without that option. However, the result is less conclusive as to
whether subjects can price the option accurately. Furthermore, the Experience-effect
treatment and the Low-Risk-of-Conversion treatment both seem to increase the likelihood
of conversion from Yellow to Green. Lastly, “more rational” subjects are able to
arbitrage and make a profit at the expense of “less rational” subjects.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. I describe what previous studies have found
on diversification discount in section 2. I discuss the methodology in section 3 and the
results in section 4. Section 5 provides a Conclusion and discussion of limitations.
Section 2: Diversification Discount – What it is

We can think of the diversification discount as occurring in two forms, a strong form
discount and a weak form discount. A strong form discount can be said to exist when
markets value conglomerate firms as lower than the combined value of the stand-alone
components (i.e., the sum of the pieces). A weak form discount can be said to exist when
markets value firms at higher than the combined value of the stand-alone components,
but lower than their combined value inclusive of the option value.
Managers consciously make the decision to diversify (Campa and Kedia 2000).
Economic theories dictate that they would only diversify when the benefits of
diversification outweigh the costs of diversification. They would choose to specialize
when the costs of diversification outweigh the benefits of diversification. Therefore, the
market value of the diversified firm should theoretically at least equal to the value of a
comparable portfolio of stand-alone firms. The costs and benefits of diversification
should be at least the same if firms choose to diversify.

Many previous studies found the existence of diversification discount. Lang and
Stulz(1994) found that the Tobin’s q of diversified firms had significantly lower average
and median q ratios than single-segment firms.1 Berger and Ofek (1995) found a 13% 15% average loss in firm value if a firm chose to diversify. Lins and Servaes(1999) found
an average of a 7% discount for diversified firms in seven emerging markets.

Yue and Zhou (2008) go further to argue that conglomerates should be valued higher than
the firm-level aggregated return on asset (ROA) when their real option values are taken
1

Tobin’s q is the present value of future cash flows divided by the replacement cost of tangible assets.

into account. The real option value comes from a diversified firm’s ability to expand
profitable segments and close down segments that are losing money. That is, diversified
firms can redeploy assets from low-return segments to high-return segments, therefore
making their values theoretically greater than the sums of their low-return and high-return
segments.

The real option theory dictates that a business should be valued at the convex function of
its profitability. Failure to recognize this valuation convexity could cause diversified
firms to be undervalued and hence traded at a discount. (Yue and Zhou 2008)

------------------------------------------Insert figure 1 here------------------------------------------On the other hand, some studies cast doubt on the existence of diversification discount.
Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) found that diversified firms were valued lower
because the business units they acquired were already discounted. Villalonga (2004)
found that there was actually diversification premium when using the Business
Information Tracking Series (BITS) to measure diversification. In short, there is no
consensus as to whether diversification discount exists.

There are several explanations for the diversification discount when it is observed. The
first is that there is really no diversification discount and the decrease in value is merely
due to data artifacts or statistical issues such as sample selection bias and
mismeasurement of diversification. Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) challenged the
standard assumption. They argued that there is a sample selection bias because firms that

choose to diversify are firms that are underperforming when compared to the average
specialized firm in the same industry in the first place. Villalonga(2004) questioned the
measurement of diversification because the actual degree of diversification in a firm is
usually greater than is reported. Campa and Kedia (2000) suggest that there is selfselection in the decision to diversify. There is also a negative correlation between firms’
choice to diversify and firm value.

Secondly, some studies argued that diversification leads to inefficiency and therefore
destroys value of the firm. Hence, it leads to the diversification discount. Berger and
Ofek (1995) attributed the decline in firm value to overinvestment and crosssubsidization. Jensen (1986) suggested that managers have incentives to increase the size
of the firm past the optimal point in order to control more resources and receive more
compensation. Therefore, mergers and acquisitions may not be in the best interest of the
firm. Diversification may destroy value because managers may have other intention other
than to increase firm value.

Research Questions:

There are five alternative possibilities I examine in this paper: (1) Participants for some
“behavioral-bias” reason value the combination of the parts as less than the sum of the
two parts taken separately (i.e., strong-form diversification discount); (2) Participants do
not realize the option advantage. Therefore, they do not choose to convert
underperforming segments to better-performing segments (i.e., weak-form diversification

discount resulting from not realizing the advantage of the option); (3) Participants do
choose to convert and are therefore aware of the advantage, but do not value the option
appropriately in terms of price. (4) If participants can observe dividends of the different
segments before deciding whether to convert, they are more likely to convert and/or price
the option more appropriately. I call it the experience-before-decision effect. (5) People
are more likely to convert low-return securities to high-return securities and price the
option more appropriately if the variance of the high-return security is lower. In other
words, the diversification discount is likely to be lower if the high-return security is less
risky.
Section 3: Methodology
The experiment is conducted under a market setting. Participants trade securities with
each other in the market via double oral auctions. Three types of securities are traded in
the experiment. They are Green, Yellow and a combination of Green and Yellow
securities called the “Combo”. The Yellow and Green securities can yield either a high
dividend (a good state) or a low dividend (bad state). The dividend that the security
yields is positive in a good state and negative in a bad state. The probability that a good
or bad state will occur, and the dividend values in each, are pre-determined by the
experimenter and revealed to the subjects beforehand.
--------------------------------------------Insert figure 2 here------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert figure 3 here-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert figure 4 here----------------------------------------

The Combo security consists of one Yellow security and one Green security. The Combo
security has to be traded as a whole on the market. In other words, the participants are not
allowed to separate a Combo security into its components and trade the Yellow and
Green securities individually on the market. All securities last for one period and have no
value at the end of the period.
-----------------------------------------Insert figure 5 here------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert figure 6 here------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert figure 7 here------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert figure 8 here-------------------------------------------Each session of the experiment comprises eleven periods and there are five intervals in
each period. In other words, intervals are the subcomponents of a period. At the inception
of all periods, the participants are allotted two securities (either Yellow, Green, or Combo)
and a loan of 70,000 experimental Francs, the currency used in the experiments. Only one
type of security is traded in a particular period. The loan has to be returned at the end of
the period, but the securities are retained as an endowment. Participants can use the loan
to purchase securities in the market from other participants, or sell any securities they
own. Trading of securities only occurs in Interval 1 of each period, while participants
receive dividends from their securities in Intervals 1 through 5. All trading is conducted
using a double oral auction market. The figure below shows how the periods are
subdivided into intervals.
------------------------------------------------Insert figure 9 here-------------------------------------

Participants receive dividends based on the number of units of securities they have on
hand at the time the dividend is revealed. Dividends are received in each interval of a
period. Thus, in each period, a security pays out dividend five times, once per interval.
As mentioned before, the dividend amount depends on whether the security yields a good
or bad state. The state that the security experiences is determined independently from
interval to interval. Therefore, in the same period, the security can be in different states
during different intervals.
As mentioned earlier, Combo securities are really combinations of one Yellow and one
Green. Therefore, a Combo security yields two dividends, one for the Yellow and the
other for the Green. The two dividends are independent of one another and based on the
probabilities revealed to the participants earlier for each type of securities.
As mentioned earlier, there are three treatment types in the experiments, the Baseline
type, the Experience-effect type, and the Low-Risk-of-Conversion type. The differences
between them involve (a) the experience a subject has with payoffs from the Yellow and
Green securities before making the conversion decision, and (b) the variance of payoffs
between the two securities. In the Baseline type and the Low-Risk-of-Conversion type,
participants make their conversion decisions early, before trading in the securities.
Conversely, in the Experience-before-Decision type, participants make the conversion
decision later, after a few periods of experiencing dividends from both securities. On the
other hand the Low-Risk-of-Conversion type presents participants with a Green (highexpected-value) security with lower variance than corresponding Green securities in the
Baseline and Experience-before-Decision types.

The first six periods of each experimental session comprised two periods involving
Yellow securities, two periods involving Green securities, and two periods involving
Combo securities without a conversion option. The purpose of these first six periods was
to establish benchmark pricing for Yellow, Green, and a simple no-conversion portfolio
of one Yellow and one Green.
The subsequent five periods of each experimental session involve Combo securities with
a conversion option. As in all other periods, trading occurs in interval 1. However, in the
third interval within the period, participants have the opportunity to convert the Yellow
security in the Combos they own to a Green security and vice versa. For Intervals 1 and 2,
dividends are calculated based on the mix of Yellow and Green securities they hold
before any conversion. For Intervals 3 through 5, dividends are calculated based on the
mix of securities after conversion.
While conversion in these periods is always effective from the 3rd through the 5th
intervals of the period, the decision is made at different points across my three treatments.
In the Baseline and Low-Risk-of-Conversion treatments, the decision is made prior to
trading in Interval 1, i.e., a the outset. In the Experience-before-Decision treatment, the
decision is made at the start of Interval 3 after experiencing dividends in Intervals 1 & 2.
Section 4: Results
Research Question One:
The first research question is whether, due to some behavioral-bias, people value the
combination of the parts as less than the sum of the two parts taken separately (i.e., do the
lab data suggest a strong-form diversification discount as defined earlier).

People do seem to value Combo-No-Conversion lower than the sum of Yellow and Green
taken separately. The first row of Table 2 shows the t-test of buying-price differences
Combo-No-Conversion and the sum of Yellow and Green securities. The first four
columns show result of t-tests comparing the price differences between Combo-NoConversion and sum of Yellow and Green to zero for each subject. Overall, there is not
enough evidence to conclude that people value Combo-No-Conversion differently than
sum of Yellow and Green. However, in the EBD type and the Low-Risk-of-Conversion
type, the differences are negative and are statistically significant at 5% and 10% levels
respectively, showing a strong form diversification discount. Thus, no definite conclusion
can be drawn as to whether the strong-form of diversification exists in the experiment.
While the overall results seem consistent with no strong-form bias, there did seem to be a
bias of that nature in the EBD and Low-risk-of-Conversion treatments.

Research Question Two:
The second research question is whether people realize the option advantage. That is, do
they choose to convert underperforming segments to better-performing segments when
given a costless opportunity to do so (i.e., weak-form diversification discount resulting
from not realizing the advantage of the option).
Table 1 shows the differences between the number of Green and Yellow security as a
percentage of the total number of security after conversion. The difference is calculated
as follows.

.  
.   
 100% 
100%
.  
.   
.  
.   
If people do not convert at all, the difference should be zero as Green and Yellow each
make up half of the total number of securities before conversion. If the difference is
positive, it means that people on average converted Yellow to Green. If the difference is
negative, it means that people on average converted Green to Yellow.
--------------------------------------------Insert Table 1 here --------------------------------------The first four columns in Table 1 test whether the differences between Green percentage
and Yellow percentage are statistical significantly different from zero. As Table 1 shows,
the differences are positive and significant at 1% overall and for each treatment type
individually. People tend to convert their Yellows to Greens. Thus, the results show that
subjects on average do understand they have a real option. They understand Green is
better than Yellow and know to convert to their own advantage.

Research Question 3:
The third research question investigates whether participants value the option
appropriately in terms of price.

First, I look at the differences in mean between prices of Combo without the option to
convert (Combo-No-Conversion) and Combo with the option to convert (Yes-Combo).
The differences are calculated as follows.
              

If the differences are positive, it means that the market price of Combo-No-Conversion is
on average higher than that of Yes-Combo. If the differences are negative, it means that
the market price of Yes-Combo is on average higher than that of Combo-No-Conversion.

I separately analyze the buy and sell price of the each type of security across different
periods for each subject. Table 2 shows t-tests of Buying Price Differences between
Combo-No-Conversion, the Sum of Green and Yellow and Yes-Combo. The second row
of Table 2 shows results of testing if the differences in buy prices between Combo-NoConversion and Yes-Combo are statistically different from zero. For overall, the Base
type (significant at 5% level) and the Experience Effect type (significant at 1% level), the
differences are negative. Although for the Low-Risk-of-Conversion type, the difference is
positive, it is not statistically significant. Participants do price Yes-Combo higher than
Combo-No-Conversion. It suggests that they understand Yes-Combo carries a real option
which is valuable.

----------------------------------Insert Table 2 here ----------------------------------------------

Next, I examine if people can price the real option appropriately. The real option value
should be 120 Francs.2 Table 3 shows the prices differences between Yes-Combo and
Combo-No-Conversion and whether it is less than the real option value of 120. The price
difference is calculated as follows.

2

The real option is effective from the third interval to the fifth interval. The value of the option is
calculated as the difference between the expected value of Green(50 Francs) and Yellow(10 Francs) per
interval multiplied by 3.

              
A positive number means price of Yes-Combo is higher than price of Combo-NoConversion and vice versa.
Overall, the one-tail t-stat that price differences are less than 120 is not statistically
significant. Participants on average are able to price the real option appropriately.
---------------------------------------Insert Table 3 here----------------------------------------------

The last three columns of Table 3 also shows the one-tail t-tests result of the price
differences between Yes-Combo and Combo-No-Conversion.

The difference between Combo-No-Conversion and Yes-Combo is lower than 120 in
Base type (significant at 1% level) and Low-Risk-of-Conversion type (significant at 1%
level). However, difference is higher than 120 in Experience Effect Case (significant at 1%
level). Different treatment type may have an effect on participants’ valuation of the real
option. Alternatively, small sample size may be the reason for the observed differences.
It is clear that people understand the real option is valuable. They seem to be able to price
the option appropriately on average.

Research Question 4:
My fourth research question asks if participants who observe dividends of the different
segments for a few iterations before deciding whether to convert are more likely to
convert and/or price the option more appropriately than participants who evaluate the
securities without experiencing any returns (i.e., the Experience-before-decision effect).

The third to last columns of Table 1 compares differences between Green and Yellow
securities as a percentage of the total number of securities after conversion between the
Base type and the Experience-before-Decision type (EBD). The negative difference
between the Base type and EBD type indicates that people are more likely to convert
Yellow to Green in the EBD type than in the Base type. Although not statistically
significant, results do incline towards the conclusion that experience before decision
increases the likelihood that people convert from Yellow to Green.

The Regression result also points towards the same direction. Table 5 is the regression
result of percentage of Green in the total mix of security regressed on …. The coefficient
of the dummy variable for EBD treatment is positive (significant at 5%). People are
more likely to convert from Yellow to Green under the EBD treatment.
----------------------------------Insert Table 5 about here -------------------------------------------

Research Question 5:
The fifth research question examines whether people are more likely to convert lowreturn securities to high-return securities and price the option more appropriately if the
variance of the high-return security is lower. In other words, the diversification discount
is likely to be lower if the high-return security is less risky.

The last column of table 1compares the differences between percentage of Green and
Yellow securities after conversion between the Baseline type and Low-Risk-of-

Conversion type. The negative difference between the Baseline type and the Low-Riskof-Conversion type indicates that people are more likely to convert Yellow to Green in
the Low-Risk-of-Conversion type than in the Baseline type. Although not statistically
significant, results do incline towards supporting a higher likelihood of conversion if
variance of high-return security is lower.

The Regression result also points towards the same direction. Table 5 is the regression
result of percentage of Green in the total mix of security. The coefficient of the dummy
variable for Low-Risk-of-Conversion treatment is positive (significant at 5%). People are
more likely to convert from Yellow to Green under the Low-Risk-of-Conversion
treatment.

Table 2 and 4 shows the differential in buy prices and differential in sell prices between
Combo-No-Conversion and Yes-Combo respectively. The last column compares the
differential between Baseline type and the Low-Risk-of-Conversion type. A negative
number in both buy and sell price indicate that the people value the real option higher in
the Low-Risk-of-Conversion type than in the Baseline case.
---------------------------------------------Insert Table 4 here----------------------------------------

Section 5: Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, I examine through laboratory experimentation whether diversification
discounts can exist in a lab setting, and some conditions which exacerbate or mitigate the
effect. More specifically, I examine whether people understand the real option value of a

business. Also, I want to find out if EBD effect and Low-Risk-of-Conversion affect
whether people exercise the real option.
Subjects do convert from Yellow (low expected value of dividend) to Green (high
expected value of dividend). People understand that Green is better than Yellow. They
also are likely to convert Yellow to Green to maximize their profit. In the experiment
setting, people understand conglomerates have real option to redeploy assets.
Results are less conclusive as to whether people are able to value the real option correctly.
Overall speaking, the buy premium3 of Yes-Combo over Combo-No-Conversion is not
statistically different from the true real option value. However, there is variation across
treatment type. The premium ranges from 65.90(significant at 1% level) Francs to
199.93(significant at 1% level) Francs while the true real option value is 120 Francs.
Subjects sometimes undervalue the real option and sometimes overvalue the real option.
The different treatment types may have affected how subjects value the real option. When
comparing the Base Case with the Low-Risk-of-Conversion type, the buy premium is
higher by 20 Francs in the latter case. It can be due to the lower variance of Green (high
expected value of dividend) in the Low-Risk-of-Conversion type than in the Base type.
When the expected value of Green remains the same and the variance decreases, Green
becomes more attractive. The value of the real option also increases. For EBD case,
subjects can be more aware of the real option value after observing two intervals of
dividend return before making the conversion decision. However, more definite

3

The buy price of Yes-Combo minus that of Combo-No-Conversion of individual subjects.

conclusion can only be drawn after expanding the sample size by running more sessions
of the experiment.
The EBD treatment seems to increase people’s likelihood to convert Yellow to Green.
The mean of Green percentage is higher than in the Base Case. Also, the regression
shows that when controlled for other factors, the EBD treatment increases the percentage
of Green. More people are likely to convert Yellow to Green under EBD treatment than
in the Base Case. People may be more aware of the downside of Yellow and upside of
Green after observing dividends for two intervals. In turn, they are more likely to convert.
The result for Low-Risk-of-Conversion treatment is also in the expected direction. People
are more likely to convert Yellow to Green under the Low-Risk-of-Conversion treatment
than in the Base Case, controlled for the inherent risk averseness of the individuals. When
variance for Green decreases, it is more attractive as an option.
Another finding I got unexpectedly is that some people think that they do not convert all
their securities from one type to another because they want to diversify. Table 5 shows
the regression of Green security as a percentage of all securities against various variables.
The variable Q13 represents people’s responses in the 13th question of the postexperiment questionnaire (PEQ). The question is “: I would not convert all my securities
to one type (i.e. all Yellow or all Green) because I want to diversify.” The coefficient is
negative (significant at 1% level). The more participants agree with the statement, the
more unlikely that they would convert Yellow to Green. It may be one of the
explanations why managers do not redeploy assets from low-return to high-return
segments. Further studies can be done on the issue.
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1 sample t-test

2 sample t-test

Table 1:
1-tail t-test of differences between percentage of Green Security and Yellow Security
Differences
between Green %
and yellow %

n

Overall

0.44***

153

Base Type

0.38***

67

Experience-beforeDecision(EBD) Type

0.57***

22

Low-Risk-of-Conversion Type

0.46***

64

Base Type vs EBD Type

-0.19

EBD Type vs Low-Risk-ofConversion Type
Base Type vs Low-Risk-ofConversion Type

0.109

***significant at
1% level
** significant at
5% level
* significant at
10% level

-0.08

Table 2:
1-tail t-test of buy price differences between No-Combo, the sum of Green and Yellow and YesCombo

Overall

Base
Type

Low-RiskofConversion
Type

Base Type
vs EBD
Type

EBD Type
vs LowRisk-ofConversion
Type

Base Type
vs LowRisk-ofConversion
Type

24

Experien
cebeforeDecision(
EBD)
Type
-177.5**

Buy Price NoCombo –
Buy Price of
(Green + Yellow)
n

-82.01

-124.4*

201.5

-53.1

148.4

15

5

2

8

Buy Price NoCombo – Buy
Price Yes-Combo
n

-17.34

70.32**

86.63

122.76***

-279.71**

-156.95*

21

5

193.08**
*
5

***significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
* significant at 10% level

11

Table 3:
1-tail t-test if mean of price difference between Yes-Combo and No-Combo and 120
Overall
Mean Price Difference
between Yes-Combo and NoCombo
n
***significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
* significant at 10% level

Base
Type
108.625 65.90**
*

EBD
Type
199.93*
**

Low-Risk-ofConversion Type
85***

56

15

20

21

Table 4:
1-tail t-test of sell price differences between No-Combo, the sum of Green and Yellow and YesCombo
1 sample t-test
Overall

Sell Price NoCombo – Sell
177.67
Price of (Yellow ***
+ Green)
n
18
Sell Price No-6.64
Combo – Sell
Price YesCombo
n
27
***significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
* significant at 10% level

Base
Type

2 sample t-test

Experien
cebeforeDecision
(EBD)
Type
-196.46

Low-RiskofConversio
n Type

Base Type
vs EBD
Type

EBD Type
vs LowRisk-ofConversion
Type

Base Type vs
Low-Risk-ofConversion
Type

-145.84*

-8.33

-50.61

-58.95

8
96.00**
*

2
184.29*
**

8
107.87*

88.28***

-292.15**

-203.87**

8

5

14

204.79*
**

Table 5:
Regression of percentage of Green security on treatment types and various control variables

Gender(Male=1, Female=0)+
Economics/Finance(Major in
Econ/Finance =1)+
School Year(Freshmen=1,
Sophomore=2, etc)
Tendency to convert to Green4
Tendency to convert to Yellow5
Control for Endowment effect 16
Control for Endowment effect 27
Control for perception of riskiness8
Control for Risk Preference9
Tendency to diversify10
Subject Risk Averseness11
Risk Aversion Treatment+
Experience-before-Decision
Treatment+
+
Dummy variable

4

Coefficient
0.14
0.31***

Standard Error
0.11
0.11

-0.14**

0.05

-0.03
0.02
-0.05**
0.07*
-0.16***
-0.02
-0.06***
0.00
0.22**
0.30**

0.03
0.03
0.02
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.04
0.09
0.13

Q7 of post-experiment questionnaire(PEQ): I exchanged Green securities for Yellow whenever I was
allowed to do so
5
Q8 of PEQ: I exchanged Yellow securities for Green whenever I was allowed to do so
6
Q9 of PEQ: When I did not exchange one security for another, it was because it was my security-- good
or bad-- and I was going to do the best with it
7
Q10 of PEQ: When I did not exchange one security for another, it was because the security I had was
better for me than the alternative I could have gotten in exchange. In retrospect, it would be better if I
have a separate question for Green and Yellow security respectively.
8
Q11 of PEQ: When I did not exchange one security for another, it was because the security I had was in
my opinion less risky than the security I could have gotten in exchange
9
Q12 of PEQ: I would rather have a smaller return which is more certainty than a bigger return that is less
certain.
10
Q13 of PEQ: I would not convert all my securities to one type (i.e. all Yellow or all Green) because I want
to diversify
11
Measured by a the lottery selection sheet in appendix 2. The higher the number, the more risk averse
one is.
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Appendix 1: Experiment Instructions
INSTRUCTIONS
General
Thank you for agreeing to participate in today’s experiment. If you have not already done so,
please read and sign the consent form, and ask if you have any questions. You may also take a
copy of the consent form with you if you want. You may make any notes, scribbles, etc. as you
wish on anything except the consent form. (But please leave all materials behind for us to collect
when you leave this room.)
You will be paid a participation fee of $3.00 for participating in today’s experiment. This flat fee
is over and above any profits you make in this experiment as described below. However, if you
make any losses in the experiment, they will be deducted from this flat fee.
In today’s experiment, you are invited to make good economic decisions and earn profits in the
process. (There are no “correct” answers. Good decisions are those that will help you earn the
highest profits.) All transactions throughout today’s experiment will be conducted in an
experimental currency we’ll call Francs. The rate of exchange will be 400 Francs = U.S. $1.00. At
the end of today’s experiment your entire profit in Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars and
paid to you in cash immediately.
Task 1: Pick a lottery
Your first task is to pick a lottery. There are ten pairs of lottery choices listed on the sheet given
to you. Each pair has two lotteries, A and B. For each pair, please write down the lottery you
would prefer to play. At the end of the experiment, we will pick one of these ten pairs of
lotteries at random. Both lotteries in that pair will then be played out, and you will get your
prize based on your pick in that pair.

Task 2: You as an investor
Overview of task 2
Task 2 is not related to Task 1. In this task, you are an investor. You will be trading in a financial
market with the other participants in this room for a number of periods. Each period is divided
into five intervals. Trading will occur in interval 1 of each period and dividends will be paid out in
intervals 1 through 5. Below is a graphical illustration of the overall organization of task 2.

The securities you will be trading with today
Before each period, the experimenters will provide you with some shares of financial security
(i.e., like a share of company stock) that will be traded in that period. There can be three types
of securities although only one type will be traded in any period. The three types of securities
will be called “Yellow,” “Green,” and a non-separable combination (or bundle) of one Yellow
and one Green, which we’ll call a “Combo.” A Combo can only be traded as a complete bundle.
You will not be allowed to separate the Green and Yellow components of the Combo and trade
those components separately. However, in certain intervals of certain periods, you will be given
the opportunity to convert either component of the Combo for the other. For example, in one
such “conversion” interval, where you have three Combo securities, you have the option to
convert any of the Yellow components of your Combos to Green components and vice versa.
More information will be provided regarding the conversion of securities later.
There is a printed document titled “List of Security” in front of you. In each period, please refer
to that for information on securities to be traded in that period.

How you trade your securities

You can buy or sell only one unit of a security at a time in an oral auction. To buy securities you
can call out a BID price, i.e., the price at which you would buy a security. To sell securities, you
can similarly call out an ASK price i.e., the price at which you sell a security. Please raise your
placard and wait until you are called on to yell out your BID or ASK. All bids and asks will be
displayed in public view until a transaction is completed. Your BID (to buy) must be higher than
any outstanding bid from another participant; your ASK (to sell) must be lower than any
outstanding asking price. A transaction will occur when someone accepts an outstanding bid or
ask.
Recording a transaction
Whenever a transaction occurs, the two individuals involved (the buyer and the seller) in the
trade will record the transaction on their pre-programmed MSExcel™ Spreadsheet. Several
transaction columns have been provided on the spreadsheet (the orange and blue cells). In
each trading period, please record your first transaction in the “Trans 1” column, your second
transaction in the “Trans 2” column and so on. Under each transaction column, you will see
“BUY” and “SELL” sub-columns. The buyer will record the price in his/her appropriate “BUY”
sub-column (orange), and the seller will record the same price in his/her appropriate “SELL” subcolumn (blue). You need to record only the price of the transaction. The spreadsheet program
will take over from that one entry and update your cash and security balances. For example, if
in period 1, you first buy a security at $400 and later sell a security at $500, your Excel
spreadsheet should be filled in as below:

How a period is organized and how your profit is calculated
At the start of each period, we will give you some securities of one of the types described above
(Yellow, Green or Combo) and an interest-free returnable loan of 70,000 Francs in cash. The
securities are yours to keep. During the trading interval in the period, you are encouraged to
buy more securities with the cash, or sell your securities and get more cash, the objective being

to make as much profit as you can. At the end of each period, you will repay the cash loan. The
securities you hold will pay a dividend in each interval of each period, but will cease to exist at
the end of the last interval of each period (i.e., they will pay five dividends and then cease to
exist). Your profit in each interval can be described by the following equation:

Profit = Cash received by selling securities (if any) – Cash paid for buying securities (if
any)
+ (No. of Yellow securities held at end of interval x dividend per Yellow security in that
interval)
+ (No. of Green securities held at end of interval x dividend per Green security in that
interval)
Please note that you can increase your profits in three ways: (1) by buying a security for a low
price and selling it for a high price; (2) by selling a security at higher than its total five-interval
dividends; and (3) by buying a security at lower than its total five-interval dividends. Probability
information provided to you will help you predict a security’s future dividends. Please note that
the dividends of the securities are determined independently in every interval. Also, dividend of
Yellow is not related to dividend of Green in any way.
The dividend paid by each security will be publicly revealed after each interval. We will give you
a password to input in column BL named “Enter Password Here”. After you input the password,
the spreadsheet will calculate your dividend income from the securities for the interval.

You will start each period with a fresh set of securities which are yours to keep, and a repayable
loan of 70,000 Francs. The spreadsheet will calculate your available cash and security balances
at all times during each trading period.
No buying without cash or short-selling
Please note that you may not use more than your existing cash balance to buy a security. You
may continue to sell securities in the meantime if you wish, as long as you have securities
available to sell. The spreadsheet will warn you if your cash balance turns negative as a result of

a purchase. Please keep a watch out for warnings in the “Warning Area” at the bottom of the
spreadsheet.

Similarly, you may not sell securities that you do not currently have. The spreadsheet will warn
you if your security balance turns negative for an attempted sale. Please keep a watch out for
warnings in the “warning Area” at the bottom of the spreadsheet.

The option to convert from one type of security to another in a combo
In periods when the security traded is a Combo, you will have the opportunity to convert any
number of Yellow securities in your combos to Green securities and vice versa. The conversion
will be effective from the interval as specified by us at the beginning of that period. For any
intervening intervals before the conversion decision is implemented, you will receive dividends
based on your original (pre-conversion) number of Green and Yellow securities in your Combo.
For intervals after the conversion decision is implemented, you will receive dividends based on
the new (post-conversion) numbers of the two types of securities.
Below is an example of the five intervals within one such period.

When you have the option to convert: How do you communicate with us about your
conversion decision?
After the trading interval has ended, we will come up to you and hand you your Conversion
Decision Sheet. Please fill out the appropriate cells. Then we will collect the sheets from you.
Below is an example. In Period 0, you have bought 2 units and sold 1 unit of Combo. Your
original allotment of Combo at the beginning of the experiment is 2 units. Therefore, your
ending balance of Combo is 3. You should put down 3 in the second column named “Combo
balance after Trading”. As there is 1 unit of Yellow and 1 unit of Green in each Combo, you have
3 units of Yellow and 3 units of Green on hand. If you want to convert 1 unit of your Yellow to
Green, you will have 2 units of Yellow and 4 units of Green after conversion. You should put
down 2 and 4 in the fourth and fifth columns respectively.

Period Combo
balance
after trading

0

3

Calculation of
Yellow and
Green
after trading

Units of Yellow
you want to hold after
conversion

x1=
Yellow
x1=
Green

2

3

Units of Green
you want to
hold
after
conversion
4

3

How to record the conversion of securities in a Combo in your Excel spreadsheet?
In your spreadsheet, please enter the number of Yellow and Green after conversion in the light
green cell in the column titled “No. of Green Securities after Conversion” and in the light yellow
cell in the column titled “No. of Yellow Securities after Conversion.” Continuing with the
example above, your Excel spreadsheet should be filled in as follows:

Time to practice!

We will now record a sample transaction in Period -1(without the option to convert) and Period
0(with the option to convert) (the practice periods) to see how this might work. Please go to the
Excel sheet for the practice period. Please hit Ctrl-S frequently during the experiment (at least
once at the end of each of your transactions) to save the data from mishaps.

ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN?

At the end of the experiment
At the end of the experiment, your programmed spreadsheet will show your ending cash
balance in Francs. Please put an “x” in the purple box and your final cash balance in U.S. dollars
will now be computed by the spreadsheet program. You will be paid the amount shown after
we have verified the amount with our record.

Now we will play a pair of lotteries from your Task 1. Please enter your choice (A or B) in the cell
provided on the spreadsheet for the purpose (see snapshot below) in the brown box. We will
come over to collect your Pick a Lottery Sheet. Next, we’ll release the outcome of each pair.
Please enter the outcome relevant to you (based on your choice) next to the “Lottery Amount:”
label on your spreadsheet(Orange box), as indicated below.

End of –Experiment Questionnaire
The experimenters will now hand out a post-experiment questionnaire which should only take a
few minutes to complete. Please fill this out while experimenters are calculating/auditing your
total earnings. After you have turned in this questionnaire, you will be given your payment in
cash (U.S. dollars). That would conclude today’s experiment.
Non-disclosure
Thanks for coming to the experiment and help me collect data for my thesis. We hope that you
will have fun and earn some money in the experiment. You are welcome and even encouraged

to tell your friends that you had fun here. However, please do not disclose details about the
experiment to your friends, including the task layouts, probabilities, payouts and your strategy.
It is because we do not wish some traders would have more information than others, which
would mess up the data set. I spend many hours designing the experiment and a considerable
amount of my own money to run these experiments. I would really appreciate it if you keep the
details of the experiment to yourselves.

Appendix 2 – Lottery Selection Sheet:
Trader Number:
Date:
Task 1 – Choose a Lottery!
There are ten pairs of lottery choices listed below. Each pair has two options, A and B. For each
pair, please write down which of the two lotteries you would prefer to play. This sheet will then
be collected by the experimenters. One of the ten pairs will be randomly chosen at the end of
the experiment to play, and both options from that pair will be run. Your earnings from the
lottery will depend on the outcome of your chosen option in that chosen pair. Your earnings
from the lottery of your choice will be your first earning in this experiment, so please make your
choice wisely to try to get the maximum amount of money from us.
Pair

Option A

Option B

1

10% chance payoff of 800 Francs,
90% chance payoff of a 640 Francs

10% chance payoff of 1540 Francs,
90% chance payoff of a 40 Francs

2

20% chance payoff of 800 Francs,
80% chance payoff of a 640 Francs

20% chance payoff of 1540 Francs,
80% chance payoff of a 40 Francs

3

30% chance payoff of 800 Francs,
70% chance payoff of a 640 Francs

30% chance payoff of 1540 Francs,
70% chance payoff of a 40 Francs

4

40% chance payoff of 800 Francs,
60% chance payoff of a 640 Francs

40% chance payoff of 1540 Francs,
60% chance payoff of a 40 Francs

5

50% chance payoff of 800 Francs,
50% chance payoff of a 640 Francs

50% chance payoff of 1540 Francs,
50% chance payoff of a 40 Francs

6

60% chance payoff of 800 Francs,
40% chance payoff of a 640 Francs

60% chance payoff of 1540 Francs,
40% chance payoff of a 40 Francs

7

70% chance payoff of 800 Francs,
30% chance payoff of a 640 Francs

70% chance payoff of 1540 Francs,
30% chance payoff of a 40 Francs

8

80% chance payoff of 800 Francs,
20% chance payoff of a 640 Francs

80% chance payoff of 1540 Francs,
20% chance payoff of a 40 Francs

9

90% chance payoff of 800 Francs,
10% chance payoff of a 640 Francs

90% chance payoff of 1540 Francs,
10% chance payoff of a 40 Francs

10

100% chance payoff of 800 Francs,
0% chance payoff of a 640 Francs

100% chance payoff of 1540 Francs,
0% chance payoff of a 40 Francs

Your
Choice(A/B)

Appendix 3 – Post-experiment Questionnaire:
Task 3: Post-Experiment Questionnaire
1. Trader Number:
2. Date: __________________ 3. Approximate time: ____________________
4. Gender (Circle one :) MALE / FEMALE
5. Academic Major ___________
6. Year in School (Circle one :) FRESHMAN / SOPHOMORE / JUNIOR / SENIOR/GRADUATE
7. I exchanged Green securities for Yellow whenever I was allowed to do so:
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
-3
-2
-1
0
+1
+2
+3

8. I exchanged Yellow securities for Green whenever I was allowed to do so:
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
-3
-2
-1
0
+1
+2
+3

9. When I did not exchange one security for another, it was because it was my security-- good or
bad-- and I was going to do the best with it.
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
-3
-2
-1
0
+1
+2
+3
10. When I did not exchange one security for another, it was because the security I had was
better for me than the alternative I could have gotten in exchange
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
-3
-2
-1
0
+1
+2
+3

11. When I did not exchange one security for another, it was because the security I had was in
my opinion less risky than the security I could have gotten in exchange
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
-3
-2
-1
0
+1
+2
+3

12. I would rather have a smaller return which is more certainty than a bigger return that is less
certain.
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
-3
-2
-1
0
+1
+2
+3
13. I would not convert all my securities to one type (i.e. all Yellow or all Green) because I want
to diversify.
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
-3

-2

-1

0

+1

+2

+3

